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221 
Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs 
David E. Pozen† 
Legal and policy debates about privacy revolve around conflicts between pri-
vacy and other goods. But privacy also conflicts with itself. Whenever securing pri-
vacy on one margin compromises privacy on another margin, a privacy-privacy 
tradeoff arises. 
This Essay introduces the phenomenon of privacy-privacy tradeoffs, with par-
ticular attention to their role in NSA surveillance. After explaining why these 
tradeoffs are pervasive in modern society and developing a typology, the Essay 
shows that many of the arguments made by the NSA’s defenders appeal not only to 
a national-security need but also to a privacy-privacy tradeoff. An appreciation of 
these tradeoffs, the Essay contends, illuminates the structure and the stakes of de-
bates over surveillance law specifically and privacy policy generally. 
INTRODUCTION 
Privacy clashes with important social values. We are told as 
much all the time.1 Commentators struggle to reconcile privacy 
and security,2 privacy and efficiency,3 privacy and technological 
innovation,4 and privacy and free speech,5 among other (real or 
 
 † Associate Professor, Columbia Law School. I am grateful to Alvaro Bedoya, Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen, Josh Chafetz, Matthew Connelly, Jennifer Daskal, Michael Farbiarz, 
Michael Graetz, Rebecca Ingber, Jeremy Kessler, Daryl Levinson, Henry Monaghan, 
Deborah Pearlstein, Neil Richards, Daniel Richman, Julian Sanchez, Shirin Sinnar, 
Ganesh Sitaraman, Lior Strahilevitz, Matthew Waxman, and my co-symposiasts for help-
ful comments and conversations. 
 1 See Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of 
Everyday Practice 148 (Yale 2012) (“The mainstream public debate about privacy typical-
ly portrays privacy as a good infinitely amenable to being traded off against other 
goods.”). See also Colin J. Bennett and Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Pol-
icy Instruments in Global Perspective 23 (MIT 2006) (“The [dominant] privacy paradigm, 
based on a conceptualization of distinct private and public realms, almost inevitably leads 
the debate to a discussion of how privacy conflicts with social or community values.”). 
 2 See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity 
of Social Life 108 (Stanford 2010) (“One of the most frequently cited conflicts . . . is be-
tween privacy and security.”). 
 3 See id at 109 (“[P]rivacy is regularly challenged by a desire or need for greater 
efficiency.”). 
 4 See, for example, Stewart A. Baker, Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren’t Stopping 
Tomorrow’s Terrorism 313–15 (Hoover 2010). 
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imagined) antinomies.6 Privacy is constantly being juxtaposed 
with competing goods and interests, balanced against disparate 
needs and demands. Legal and policy debates about privacy re-
volve around these tradeoffs. 
But privacy also clashes with itself. That is to say, in myriad 
social and regulatory contexts, enhancing or preserving privacy 
along a certain axis may entail compromising privacy along an-
other axis. If they wish to be more analytically rigorous, theo-
rists and decisionmakers must take such privacy-privacy 
tradeoffs into account. If they wish to advance the cause of pri-
vacy, civil libertarians must do the same. 
Privacy-privacy tradeoffs come in a variety of flavors. Some-
times they are unexpected and unwanted. When EU citizens be-
gan exercising their right to be forgotten last year and flooded 
Google with “delete me” requests, the deleted links quickly re-
appeared—together with the relevant search terms—on a web-
site devoted to documenting Internet censorship.7 These citizens’ 
bid for online privacy thus seems to have triggered the Streisand 
effect, “whereby an attempt to suppress a disclosed item of in-
formation only draws more attention to it.”8 Other times, privacy-
privacy tradeoffs are consciously cultivated and promoted. The 
Transportation Security Administration’s PreCheck program in-
vites travelers to “volunteer personal information in advance” if 
they wish “to leave on their shoes, belts and light outerwear and 
keep their laptops in their bags.”9 Enhanced governmental ac-
cess to your data can be traded for reduced access to your body 
and belongings. 
In many cases, privacy-privacy tradeoffs simply follow from 
scarce resources and opportunity costs. A tenant on a fixed 
 
 5 See generally, for example, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information 
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking about You, 
52 Stan L Rev 1049 (2000). 
 6 For a particularly intriguing supplement to the standard list, see generally Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U Chi L Rev 363 (2008). 
 7 See Jeff John Roberts, “Hidden from Google” Shows Sites Censored under EU’s 
Right-to-Be-Forgotten Law (Gigaom, July 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8P26 
-H4YL. 
 8 David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Con-
dones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 Harv L Rev 512, 558 n 241 (2013), citing 
What Is the Streisand Effect? (The Economist, Apr 15, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6TDU-ZBFW. 
 9 Mark Johanson, 7 Questions about TSA’s PreCheck Program Answered (Interna-
tional Business Times, Sept 4, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/NRD7-QS52. This is a 
privacy-convenience tradeoff as well as a privacy-privacy tradeoff. 
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budget who spends money soundproofing her walls will have 
less to spend on mending her curtains. Alternatively, these 
tradeoffs may be caused by behavioral responses and dynamic 
feedback effects. Increasing airline passengers’ privacy levels 
from X at time 1 to a multiple of X at time 2 may increase the 
odds of a terrorist attack, with the consequence that passengers’ 
privacy levels will be reduced to a fraction of X at time 3. In still 
other cases, risk is redistributed across different aspects or 
bearers of privacy. By establishing a forensic DNA database, 
law-enforcement officials may impair the privacy of everyone 
whose DNA is included but protect the privacy of a smaller 
group of individuals who will not be needlessly investigated for 
the crimes of others. By “stripping network users of any privacy 
or anonymity” when they are online,10 an intelligence agency 
may deter its analysts from exceeding their investigative man-
dates and thereby secure a measure of privacy for the rest of so-
ciety—or at least for the analysts’ love interests.11 
While the idea of privacy-privacy tradeoffs appears to be 
new to the legal literature,12 the basic logic behind the idea is 
not. Criminal law scholars have called attention to the ways in 
which police practices advantage certain privacy interests at the 
expense of others.13 And theorists in law and other disciplines 
 
 10 Baker, Skating on Stilts at 340 (cited in note 4). 
 11 See Evan Perez, NSA: Some Used Spying Power to Snoop on Lovers (CNN, Sept 
27, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/T69M-SZXG. 
 12 I have found only one prior work that examines privacy-privacy tradeoffs as 
such: a paper by computer scientists reporting the results of a survey that asked partici-
pants about their willingness to share with a social network certain information—
photographs, “friend” lists, or their current location—in exchange for notifications about 
other users’ photographs in which the participants might appear. See generally Benjamin 
Henne and Matthew Smith, Awareness about Photos on the Web and How Privacy-
Privacy-Tradeoffs Could Help, in Andrew A. Adams, Michael Brenner, and Matthew 
Smith, eds, Financial Cryptography and Data Security 131 (Springer 2013). See also text 
accompanying notes 87–88 (suggesting extensions of this research). The possibility of 
privacy-privacy tradeoffs is implicitly recognized in numerous other works. See, for ex-
ample, Benjamin Wittes and Jodie C. Liu, The Privacy Paradox: The Privacy Benefits of 
Privacy Threats *3 (Brookings Institution, May 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/P28P 
-VPLC (arguing that “technologies often offer privacy with one hand while creating pri-
vacy risks with the other”). 
 13 See generally, for example, Jacqueline E. Ross, Book Review, Tradeoffs in Un-
dercover Investigations: A Comparative Perspective, 69 U Chi L Rev 1501 (2002) (survey-
ing competing techniques used in undercover policing, including several—such as elec-
tronic surveillance versus infiltration—that implicate privacy-privacy tradeoffs); William 
J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 Geo Wash L Rev 1265 
(1999) (criticizing Fourth Amendment law’s focus on privacy as shifting legal protection 
from poorer to wealthier suspects). 
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have begun to explore “security-security tradeoffs,”14 “liberty-
liberty tradeoffs,”15 “health-health tradeoffs,”16 “democracy-
democracy tradeoffs,”17 and other such internal oppositions. Like 
security, liberty, health, and democracy, privacy is a complex 
normative value embedded in a range of complex social practic-
es. The possibilities for conflict within such a matrix are vast. 
Moreover, privacy-privacy tradeoffs are not only widespread in 
modern society but also proliferating, as new technologies and 
new conceptions of privacy continually generate new ways in 
which privacy interests may be violated or vindicated. 
This Essay introduces the phenomenon of privacy-privacy 
tradeoffs, along with some conceptual tools to help negotiate 
them. In keeping with the theme of this Symposium, the Essay 
focuses on governmental threats to privacy and in particular on 
national-security surveillance. It also begins to sketch links be-
tween this subject and questions of institutional design within 
the regulatory state. An appreciation of privacy-privacy 
tradeoffs, the Essay shows, can clarify and enrich debates over 
the activities of the NSA as well as over privacy policy generally. 
Reconceptualizing these debates as pitting privacy against pri-
vacy enables more productive consequentialist and critical analy-
sis, and it might even help to disentrench some of the political 
and ideological divisions that have hardened around privacy-
versus-security, privacy-versus-technology, and other conven-
tional frameworks. 
This Essay offers no general solution to sort out these 
tradeoffs, as I am doubtful that there is one to be had. I have be-
come increasingly convinced, however, that we cannot make 
headway on many privacy problems unless we understand the 
privacy-privacy tradeoffs at stake. The Essay aspires, above all, 
to frame and provoke ongoing discussion toward that end. 
 
 14 See, for example, Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding 
Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 Cal L Rev 301, 318–23 (2009). 
 15 See, for example, Adrian Vermeule, A New Deal for Civil Liberties: An Essay in 
Honor of Cass R. Sunstein, 43 Tulsa L Rev 921, 922–25 (2008). 
 16 See generally, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U Chi 
L Rev 1533 (1996). 
 17 See, for example, Robert E. Goodin, Global Democracy: In the Beginning, 2 Intl 
Theory 175, 179 n 11 (2010). 
 2016] Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs 225 
 
I.  PLURALISTIC PRIVACY 
Before turning to the subject of tradeoffs, I need to say a few 
words on the subject of privacy. Setting forth a crisp definition of 
the latter turns out to be remarkably difficult to do. In contem-
porary discourse, privacy has become associated with “freedom 
of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s home, con-
trol over personal information, freedom from surveillance, pro-
tection of one’s reputation, and protection from searches and in-
terrogations,” among other things.18 It is a commonplace in the 
privacy literature to bemoan the “bewildering variety of mean-
ings” the concept has accumulated.19 About the only “point on 
which there seems to be near-unanimous agreement,” Professor 
Helen Nissenbaum observes, “is that privacy is a messy and 
complex subject.”20 
In recent years, many privacy theorists have made what we 
might call a pluralistic turn: rejecting approaches to privacy that 
strive to identify its essence or its core characteristics and settling, 
instead, “on an understanding of privacy as an umbrella term that 
encompasses a variety of related meanings.”21 The concept of pri-
vacy, on this view, comprises a web of overlapping conceptions, 
dimensions, and values, none of which necessarily has lexical pri-
ority over any other. Professor Daniel Solove’s work is exemplary 
in this regard. Drawing on philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s no-
tion of family resemblances, Solove forcefully argues against con-
ceptualizing privacy through a priori generalizations, such as 
 
 18 Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy 1 (Harvard 2008). 
 19 Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy: Rethinking Civil Liberties in the Digital Age 8 
(Oxford 2015). See also, for example, Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 
Georgetown L J 2087, 2087 (2001) (“Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in com-
peting and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, 
that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all.”).  
 20 Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context at 67 (cited in note 2). Notwithstanding these 
laments, the “reductionist” position—which maintains that ostensible privacy claims are 
reducible to other sorts of claims and would be more fruitfully analyzed in nonprivacy 
terms—has largely lost out in academic as well as popular commentary. See generally 
Privacy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Aug 9, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/VUZ2-WLXD (explaining that, against the reductionists, “most theorists 
take the view that privacy is a meaningful and valuable concept”). 
 21 Richards, Intellectual Privacy at 9 (cited in note 19). See also Privacy at § 3.6 
(cited in note 20) (discussing a range of theorists who “defend the view that privacy has 
broad scope, inclusive of the multiple types of privacy issues described by the [US Su-
preme] Court, even though there is no simple definition”). 
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necessary and sufficient conditions, in favor of a pluralistic, “bot-
tom up” approach focused on “privacy problems.”22 
Reviewing the extensive treatments of privacy in legal 
scholarship and judicial opinions, Solove finds that at least six 
different understandings of privacy have emerged: (1) “the right 
to be let alone,” (2) “limited access to the self,” (3) “secrecy,” 
(4) “control over personal information,” (5) “personhood,” or “the 
protection of one’s personality, individuality, and dignity,” and 
(6) “intimacy,” or “control over . . . one’s intimate relationships or 
aspects of life.”23 Solove might have added still more items to the 
list. Professor Kendall Thomas, for instance, has discerned “zonal, 
relational, and decisional” paradigms of privacy in Supreme 
Court case law, focused respectively on preserving “space[s] of civ-
il sanctuary,” “freedom to associate with others in intimate rela-
tion,” and autonomous decisionmaking on certain important mat-
ters.24 Professor Julie Cohen has recently urged that privacy be 
reimagined, in “postliberal” terms, as a resource for the develop-
ment of critical subjectivity and “an interest in breathing room to 
engage in socially situated processes of boundary management.”25 
In an effort to bring some analytic order to this sprawl, 
Solove has developed a taxonomy of widely recognized privacy 
problems. It is worth reproducing the taxonomy in full: 
1. Information collection 
 Surveillance 
 Interrogation 
2. Information processing 
 Aggregation 
 Identification 
 Insecurity 
 Secondary use 
 Exclusion 
3. Information dissemination 
 Breach of confidentiality 
 Disclosure 
 Exposure 
 Increased accessibility 
 
 22 Solove, Understanding Privacy at 8–9 (cited in note 18). For an expanded discus-
sion of this pluralistic understanding of privacy, see id at 39–77. 
 23 Id at 12–37. 
 24 Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 Colum L Rev 1431, 1443–
48 (1992). 
 25 Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self at 126, 149 (cited in note 1). 
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 Blackmail 
 Appropriation 
 Distortion 
4. Invasion 
 Intrusion 
 Decisional interference26 
For the purposes of this Essay, it does not much matter 
whether these classifications are compelling in all particulars27 
or whether the messiness and complexity of privacy will ever be 
fully elucidated. The important thing to see is how many inter-
ests and concerns are now taken to be privacy interests and con-
cerns. Solove, to reiterate, has identified no fewer than six broad 
conceptions of privacy and sixteen broad categories of “privacy 
problems that have achieved a significant degree of social recogni-
tion.”28 This capaciousness exacerbates the dilemma of privacy-
privacy tradeoffs. The more sorts of privacy claims that there 
are, the greater the risk that there will be conflicts among 
them.29 
Just consider the first two categories in Solove’s taxonomy: 
surveillance and interrogation. Each activity, Solove explains, 
may cause privacy harms. But it does not follow that the privacy 
harms they cause will always or typically be additive. Surveil-
lance and interrogation are both techniques used by law-
enforcement officials to gather information that may be relevant 
for identifying and punishing criminals. A police force that de-
votes significant resources to surveillance will have fewer re-
sources left over—and perhaps less of a practical need—for in-
terrogation.30 As privacy problems, surveillance and 
interrogation are plausible substitutes. Tightening the rules 
on criminal interrogation, consequently, could lead to a net 
 
 26 Solove, Understanding Privacy at 10–11 (cited in note 18). See also id at 101–70 
(elaborating this taxonomy). 
 27 For a critique of Solove’s approach, see M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy 
Harm, 86 Ind L J 1131, 1139–42 (2011). 
 28 Solove, Understanding Privacy at 101–02 (cited in note 18). 
 29 See Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin, Introduction: Basic Rights and Be-
yond, in Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin, eds, Global Basic Rights 1, 23 (Oxford 
2009) (“The more rights there are, the greater the danger that we will face ‘rights-rights 
trade-offs.’”). 
 30 On similar logic, former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover reportedly “opposed the 
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, believing the intelligence capa-
bilities of the FBI to be sufficient to locate any risk that might emerge from that commu-
nity.” Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S Cal L Rev 575, 609 n 
126 (2010). 
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decrease in a community’s privacy insofar as it pushes the police 
to intensify surveillance. 
Or consider disclosure and blackmail. Again, each is a wide-
ly recognized menace to privacy. Yet blackmail, as Solove de-
fines it, is nothing more or less than the threat of disclosure of 
truthful personal information.31 And that threat has no force 
once a given datum has become public. Voluntary divulgences 
about one’s personal life can be self-protective for this reason. 
Such divulgences, on some accounts, are a defining feature of 
our digital age. The rise of what Professor Bernard Harcourt 
calls the “expository society”—in which people eagerly give up 
their most intimate details “in a mad frenzy” of “texts, Tweets, 
emoticons and Instagrams, e-mails and Snapchats, Facebook 
posts, links, shares and likes”32—has had at least one happy side 
effect for our collective privacy, in that it has rendered various 
forms of blackmail otiose. 
Other privacy-privacy tradeoffs will be more complex,33 but 
these examples suffice to make the point. Solove offers his tax-
onomy to “enable courts and policymakers to better balance pri-
vacy against countervailing interests.”34 The very breadth of the 
taxonomy underscores the need to start balancing privacy 
against itself. 
II.  TRADEOFF TYPES AND TRIGGERS 
When exactly does the need to balance privacy against pri-
vacy arise, though? And what might these balancing efforts look 
like? Although a comprehensive answer is well beyond the scope 
of this Essay, drawing some distinctions among privacy-privacy 
tradeoffs can help illuminate the structure of the problem.35 
 
 31 Solove, Understanding Privacy at 105 (cited in note 18). 
 32 Bernard E. Harcourt, The Expository Society: Spectacle, Surveillance, and Exhi-
bition in the Neoliberal Age of Big Data *11 (Sciences Po Faculty Workshop in Political 
Theory, Nov 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5BVF-9V3F. 
 33 To take just one recurring case suggested by Solove’s earlier work, facilitating 
public access to documents that are held in government databases might reduce the pri-
vacy problem of “exclusion,” or “the failure to provide individuals with notice and input 
about their records,” while increasing the risk that personal information will be disclosed 
or exposed to others. Solove, Understanding Privacy at 134 (cited in note 18). See also 
Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age 
150–54 (NYU 2004) (discussing potential tensions between privacy and open-access 
laws). 
 34 Solove, Understanding Privacy at 10 (cited in note 18). 
 35 For a valuable typology of risk-risk tradeoffs, see John D. Graham and Jonathan 
Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, 
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Governmental entities and corporations maintain countless 
policies that have implications for privacy.36 A decision to 
change, or not to change, any given policy can occasion at least 
five basic types of privacy-privacy tradeoffs. These types are not 
mutually exclusive and may appear in combination. The 
tradeoffs themselves may be intentional or inadvertent, highly 
visible or largely unseen. 
First, a policy may shift privacy burdens or benefits from 
one group in the population to another. If the New York City Po-
lice Department relies on ethnic profiling to redeploy agents 
from streets and sidewalks to Islamic cultural centers, Muslim 
New Yorkers may experience a (significant) loss of privacy while 
everyone else experiences a (marginal) gain. We can call these 
sorts of privacy-privacy tradeoffs distributional tradeoffs.37 
Second, risk may be shifted not only among groups that suf-
fer privacy harms but also among groups that cause harm to a 
certain privacy interest—among privacy violators as well as vic-
tims. An e-reader such as Amazon’s Kindle prevents my fellow 
riders on the subway from seeing what I am reading, but it tells 
Amazon in great detail about what I am reading, including how 
many seconds I have spent on each page.38 We can call these 
sorts of tradeoffs directional tradeoffs, to reflect that the privacy 
threat has been redirected so that it comes from one source in-
stead of another. 
Third, a policy may shift privacy risk across time periods. 
This is part of the privacy bargain offered by programs such as 
PreCheck that do intensive vetting of prospective passengers, 
 
eds, Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment 1, 22–25 
(Harvard 1995). For a valuable “conceptual map” of health-health tradeoffs, see Sunstein, 
63 U Chi L Rev at 1538–42 (cited in note 16). 
 36 Again, governmental decisions are the focus of this Essay, although privacy-
privacy tradeoffs commonly arise from individual and corporate decisions as well.  
 37 Professor Strahilevitz provides a wide-ranging survey of privacy policy’s distribu-
tive implications, with numerous examples that may involve privacy-privacy tradeoffs, in 
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv L Rev 
2010 (2013). 
 38 See Richards, Intellectual Privacy at 128–29 (cited in note 19). Benjamin Wittes 
and Jodie Liu emphasize more generally that digital technologies “we commonly think of 
as privacy-eroding may, in fact, enhance privacy from the people in our immediate sur-
roundings,” even as they erode privacy vis-à-vis “large physically remote entities” such 
as corporations and governments. Wittes and Liu, The Privacy Paradox at *10 (cited in 
note 12). See also Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 125 Harv L Rev 476, 512–17 (2011) (presenting the telephone as an exam-
ple of how emerging technologies may enable new modes of surveillance while allowing 
for the circumvention of others). 
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customers, employees, or the like at a threshold stage, on the 
promise of reduced scrutiny thereafter.39 Maximalist privacy pol-
icies, as suggested in the Introduction’s airline example,40 may 
lead to unintended intertemporal transfers (and prove self-
defeating) inasmuch as they invite bad outcomes, which then 
generate demand for new policies that substantially slash priva-
cy.41 We can call these sorts of tradeoffs dynamic tradeoffs. 
Fourth, a policy may shift risk across different privacy in-
terests. Recall the six conceptions of privacy and sixteen catego-
ries of “privacy problems” that Professor Solove has identified.42 
Whenever a policy enhances privacy on one of these dimensions 
while eroding it on another, a tradeoff arises. Although the mili-
tary’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy allowed gay service members 
to conceal information about their intimate lives, it arguably 
undermined other aspects of their privacy by spotlighting the 
question of sexual orientation and constricting their ability to 
control their social identities.43 Although a policy requiring that 
police officers wear body cameras may advance various privacy 
goals through averted police misconduct—for instance, by reduc-
ing the number of unreasonable searches or seizures—those 
same cameras raise privacy concerns for the suspects, victims, 
bystanders, and officers who may be captured on film.44 Target-
ing one privacy risk creates a new, countervailing risk. We can 
call these sorts of tradeoffs dimensional tradeoffs. 
 
 39 See text accompanying note 9 (describing PreCheck). PreCheck also trades off 
different privacy interests (roughly, personal information for physical intrusion) and 
may tend to intensify screening of non-PreCheck passengers—making it a dynamic, di-
mensional, and distributional tradeoff all at once. 
 40 See text accompanying notes 9–10. 
 41 Individual efforts to preserve privacy can likewise have unintended dynamic ef-
fects. In the area of surveillance, for example, a person’s use of encryption may shield the 
content of her communications from the gaze of the intelligence services but flag her as a 
suspicious type, deserving of future scrutiny. See Mathew J. Schwartz, Want NSA Atten-
tion? Use Encrypted Communications (InformationWeek, June 21, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/XX84-RSWZ (discussing actions that NSA analysts are authorized to 
take when encryption is encountered).  
 42 See text accompanying notes 23–26. 
 43 See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Pre-
sumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 Yale L J 485, 544–50 (1998) (ana-
lyzing the “evasive” advantages and disadvantages of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell). See also 
text accompanying notes 23–25 (noting the existence of decisional, dignitarian, and rela-
tional, as well as secrecy-centered, conceptions of privacy). 
 44 See Rachel Weiner, Police Body Cameras Spur Privacy Debate (Wash Post, Nov 
10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/PT9L-MJUK (discussing these privacy concerns 
and noting the American Civil Liberties Union’s ambivalent support for on-body police 
cameras). 
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Certain dimensional tradeoffs recur regularly. State inter-
ventions to secure legal privacy rights, for instance, tend to butt 
up against people’s confidentiality and concealment interests. 
Government surveillance aspires to deter a wide range of priva-
cy crimes through the very act of impinging on privacy.45 A call 
to the police after a burglary may well bring more unwelcome 
visitors into one’s home. And government subsidies that enhance 
recipients’ so-called decisional privacy often come with an infor-
mational privacy “tax.” The Hyde Amendment has restricted the 
Department of Health and Human Services from funding abor-
tion care for Medicaid recipients since 1976.46 This refusal to 
subsidize marks a defeat for decisional privacy in that it im-
pedes women’s exercise of their right to obtain an abortion; but 
it carries at least some benefit for informational privacy in that 
once the government is no longer paying for abortions, there is 
necessarily less official data collection about who obtains them 
and under what circumstances. 
Finally, when the traded-off risks are understood to be not 
just factually but qualitatively distinct from or even incommen-
surate with each other, we might say that a dimensional 
tradeoff rises to the level of a domain tradeoff. The privacy in-
terests on either side of the ledger, in such a case, seem to impli-
cate different domains of value. They “cannot be aligned along a 
single metric without doing violence to our considered judg-
ments about how these [interests] are best characterized.”47 Per-
haps the privacy problems caused by abortion restrictions and 
government record keeping are immiscible in this way.48 
 
 45 See Part III.B. 
 46 Act of Sept 30, 1976 § 209 (“Hyde Amendment”), Pub L No 94-439, 90 Stat 1418, 
1434. I thank Lior Strahilevitz for suggesting this example, among others. 
 47 Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779, 
796, 798 (1994) (emphasis omitted) (defining incommensurability in a “very thin” sense). 
The possibility that privacy encompasses distinct domains of value brings us back to de-
bates over the concept’s utility and coherence. Wherever one stands on those debates, 
however, it seems to me that a descriptively and phenomenologically accurate typology—
one that captures how privacy is understood and experienced in contemporary society—
must admit these tradeoffs. See Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1552 (cited in note 16) (ob-
serving that “problems of incommensurability . . . play a large role in health-health com-
parisons” and “certainly” cannot be eliminated). 
 48 But see Matthew B. Kugler, Affinities in Privacy Attitudes: A Psychological Ap-
proach to Unifying Informational and Decisional Privacy *11–39 (unpublished manu-
script, July 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/JVZ6-VPFZ (exploring psychological 
connections between decisional and informational privacy); Neil M. Richards, Book Re-
view, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 Georgetown L J 1087, 1102–21 (2006) 
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Privacy-privacy tradeoffs might also be parsed, in more 
functional terms, according to the triggers or mechanisms that 
explain their existence. Some interventions to safeguard one 
form of privacy will jeopardize another form of privacy quite di-
rectly when implemented, as in the case of police body camer-
as.49 Other interventions will give rise to tradeoffs more indirect-
ly, through the adaptive behavior they induce. Regulators or 
regulated parties may respond to a new measure by shifting to 
different practices that impinge on privacy in different ways.50 
Vulnerable actors may overestimate a measure’s benefits and be 
lulled into reducing their own precautions.51 Strategic actors 
may exploit the rigidities caused by privacy protections in ways 
that render them unsustainable.52 Policymakers may also bring 
about or exacerbate privacy-privacy tradeoffs through ignorance of 
relevant facts or future contingencies; through analytic error, in-
cluding selective attention to a certain aspect of privacy to the ne-
glect of others;53 or through the standard opportunity costs associ-
ated with devoting limited resources to any particular concern. 
The foregoing points can be distilled into a simple schemat-
ic. Although just one of many ways to carve up the landscape,54 
 
(exploring doctrinal and theoretical connections between decisional and informational 
privacy).  
 49 See Samuel J. Rascoff and Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: 
Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U Chi L Rev 1763, 
1771–75 (2002) (classifying such tradeoffs as “direct risk tradeoffs” and noting that para-
digmatic examples include “the negative side effects associated with medical interventions”). 
 50 See text accompanying notes 29–30 (giving the hypothetical example of a police 
force ramping up surveillance in response to new restrictions on interrogation). 
 51 See Rascoff and Revesz, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1777–78 (cited in note 49), quoting W. 
Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk 225 (Oxford 
1992) (discussing “lulling effects,” whereby the “introduction of a safety measure . . . can 
have the effect of ‘produc[ing] misperceptions that lead consumers to reduce their safety 
precautions because they overestimate the product’s safety’”). 
 52 See text accompanying notes 9–10 (noting possible iterated interactions between 
airline passengers’ privacy levels and terrorist threats). 
 53 See Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty De-
pends on Taxes 125–26 (Norton 1999) (explaining that “the problem of selective attention” 
can both generate and obscure rights-rights and risk-risk tradeoffs); Robert K. Merton, The 
Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 Am Sociological Rev 894, 898–
902 (1936) (identifying ignorance, error, and the “imperious immediacy of interest” as 
pervasive causes of unintended consequences). 
 54 Among other possibilities, each of the tradeoff types outlined above might be fur-
ther sliced on the basis of the number of persons affected, the role of governmental ver-
sus nongovernmental actors, or the expected probability and salience of privacy gains 
and losses. Be that as it may, I believe these categories capture key structural features of 
privacy-privacy tradeoffs and so supply a useful if limited tool kit for analyzing this het-
erogeneous phenomenon. 
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this typology furnishes a serviceable conceptual map and gives a 
sense of the regularity, as well as the endless variety and fluidi-
ty, of privacy-privacy tradeoffs. 
TABLE 1.  A TYPOLOGY OF PRIVACY-PRIVACY TRADEOFFS 
 
Tradeoff Type Traded-Off Element Trigger 
Distributional Privacy Victims 
Changed Circumstances 
Direct Effects 
Error 
Feedback Effects 
Ignorance 
Lulling Effects 
Opportunity Costs 
Substitution Effects 
Directional Privacy Violators 
Dynamic Time Periods 
Dimensional Privacy Interests 
Domain 
Qualitatively  
Distinct 
Privacy Interests 
 
III.  PRIVACY-PRIVACY TRADEOFFS AND NSA SURVEILLANCE 
We are now in a position to see more clearly both the struc-
ture and the stakes of current debates over NSA surveillance re-
form. As this Part will show, many of the justifications offered 
by the NSA’s defenders appeal not only to an alleged national-
security need but also to a privacy-privacy tradeoff.55 These ar-
guments may not be good arguments; their force depends on the 
practical realities of surveillance as well as one’s normative 
views about which forms of privacy matter most. But the argu-
ments cannot be fairly assessed—or compellingly countered—
without an understanding of the privacy-privacy tradeoffs on 
which they are premised. 
A. NSA Analysts versus Ordinary Citizens? 
We have already touched on one such argument in defense of 
NSA surveillance: the contention that by minimizing the network 
privacy of its own employees and contractors, the NSA can safe-
guard the communications privacy of everyone else.56 Former 
 
 55 An additional example of an alleged privacy-privacy tradeoff involving the NSA 
is discussed in note 94. 
 56 See text accompanying notes 10–11. 
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NSA general counsel Stewart Baker has proposed that this 
tradeoff be made the centerpiece of any new reforms. “The short 
answer,” Baker suggests, is that “we can use information tech-
nology to make sure that government officials lose their privacy 
when they misuse data that has been gathered for legitimate 
reasons.”57 Applying this approach, the NSA would “track every 
database search made by every user,” and then “follow any dis-
tribution of that data outside the system.”58 
The attraction of this proposal, apart from the vision of us-
ing technology to tame technology, lies in its promise of a stark 
distributional tradeoff: NSA analysts’ privacy losses will be We 
the People’s gains. As redistributive schemes go, this one is 
about as unobjectionable as it gets. Not only do ordinary citizens 
outnumber NSA analysts by many orders of magnitude, but the 
latter’s privacy interests in being given unfettered access to the 
former’s data also seem tenuous at best. 
The major limitation of this proposal is that it is unclear 
how much privacy would actually be redistributed. Baker seeks 
to detect and deter the “misuse” of collected data, such as unlaw-
ful disclosures to the media or prurient snooping for personal ra-
ther than professional reasons. The privacy problems raised by 
such misuse, however, are just a subset of the privacy problems 
raised by NSA surveillance, and not necessarily the most con-
cerning subset. Even if implemented to a T, Baker’s proposal 
would enhance ordinary citizens’ privacy only with respect to the 
rogue behaviors of individual NSA analysts. As a distributional 
tradeoff, the proposal seems stark; but as a dimensional 
tradeoff, the proposal is quite limited. Although this may be a 
trade worth making, it is not responsive to many of the privacy 
concerns animating the reform movement. 
 
 57 Baker, Skating on Stilts at 321 (cited in note 4). 
 58 Id. See also id at 340–41 (expanding on this idea); The Administration’s Use of 
FISA Authorities: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representa-
tives, 113th Cong, 1st Sess 75 (2013) (“FISA Hearing”) (statement of Stewart A. Baker) 
(contending that the “best way” to protect privacy is for “the government to use new 
technologies to better monitor government employees who have access to sensitive in-
formation”); Jack Goldsmith, The Cyberthreat, Government Network Operations, and the 
Fourth Amendment *16 (Brookings Institution, Dec 8, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q3KWCNSX, citing David Brin, The Transparent Society: Will Technolo-
gy Force Us to Choose between Privacy and Freedom? (Addison-Wesley 1998) (noting, in a 
discussion of cybersecurity surveillance, that the government could “employ David Brin’s 
strategy of snooping on itself to ensure that it does not go further than necessary in 
snooping on its citizens”). 
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B. Cybersecurity versus Cybersurveillance? 
The argument just reviewed envisions the NSA as the 
guardian of Americans’ privacy vis-à-vis internal threats posed 
by its own badly behaving employees. Another—more challeng-
ing and ambitious—argument made by the NSA’s defenders en-
visions the agency as the guardian of Americans’ privacy vis-à-
vis external threats to cybersecurity. “To keep our computer and 
telecommunication networks secure,” Professor Jack Goldsmith 
contends, “the government will eventually need to monitor and 
collect intelligence on those networks using techniques similar 
to ones [many] find reprehensible when done for counterterror-
ism ends.”59 Specifically, the FBI’s general counsel has suggested 
that “the government needs to be able to monitor all Internet 
communications. All of them.”60 
If this argument is correct, it has significant implications for 
civil liberties because “[r]elentless assaults on America’s com-
puter networks by . . . foreign governments, hackers and crimi-
nals”61 represent a significant threat not only to economic and 
defense interests but also to personal privacy. A world in which 
America’s computer networks are constantly being exploited is a 
world in which Americans’ sensitive data held by banks, hospi-
tals, employers, government agencies, and so forth are at con-
stant risk of being stolen, scrambled, or revealed. Cybersecurity 
and privacy are often cast as antagonists,62 for plausible reasons. 
The privacy concerns raised by governmental monitoring of all 
Internet communications are especially acute. And yet the effec-
tive provision of cybersecurity reduces certain sorts of privacy 
risks even as it generates others. A sense of security about one’s 
online data is a necessary if insufficient condition for the at-
tainment of privacy in the digital age.63 
 
 59 Jack Goldsmith, We Need an Invasive NSA (New Republic, Oct 10, 2013), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/PP9F-CRUV. As Goldsmith recounts, the previous director of 
the NSA is said to have insisted: “I can’t defend the country until I’m into all the net-
works.” Id (quoting General Keith Alexander). 
 60 James A. Baker, National Security and the Constitution *8 (Clarke Forum for 
Contemporary Issues, Sept 12, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/6CU5-JBPW. Baker 
sympathetically highlighted this position without committing to it. See id. 
 61 Goldsmith, We Need an Invasive NSA (cited in note 59), quoting Editorial, Cyber-
security at Risk (NY Times, July 31, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/NS6Z-VQTW. 
 62 See, for example, Julia Boorstin, Privacy vs. Cybersecurity: The Debate Heats Up 
(CNBC, Apr 10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/VPF6-27PU (highlighting the privacy 
concerns raised by a 2013 cybersecurity bill). 
 63 See Solove, Understanding Privacy at 126–29 (cited in note 18) (discussing privacy 
harms caused by “insecurity,” or lack of protection against data leakage, contamination, 
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Is a leading role for the NSA a necessary condition for the 
effective provision of cybersecurity, however? It is exceedingly 
difficult to answer this question—and therefore to assess this 
privacy-privacy tradeoff—because many of the relevant varia-
bles are exceedingly complex, counterfactual, or secret. Much 
more would need to be known about the nature and scope of the 
cybersecurity threat as it relates to privacy, about the NSA’s 
distinctive capabilities to combat the threat, and about the pri-
vacy protections that would be built into those capabilities. The 
distributional, dynamic, and dimensional implications of this 
tradeoff all remain hazy at this time. 
The NSA has unique empirical insight into these matters 
and a political incentive to promote (indeed, to overstate) this 
line of argument—one that recasts the agency as the great pro-
tector rather than the great usurper of Americans’ privacy. Per-
haps the most that can be said with confidence, then, is that the 
burden should rest with the NSA to establish the plausibility 
and desirability of this privacy-privacy tradeoff, and the agency 
has not met that burden. 
C. Governmental Custody of Metadata versus Commercial 
Custody of Metadata? 
Of all the NSA activities revealed by Edward Snowden, the 
one that elicited fiercest domestic backlash was the agency’s on-
going collection of Americans’ telephone call records under § 215 
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.64 Both the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) and the President’s Review 
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies (“Re-
view Group”) identified the bulk telephony metadata program as 
 
and theft). The security-versus-surveillance tradeoff is by no means confined to the NSA 
or to the digital realm, and it has many private sector manifestations as well. At this 
writing, for instance, AT&T and other companies are reportedly developing services that 
will enable customers to limit their exposure to identity theft by allowing credit card is-
suers to track, in real time, the geolocation of their phones. See Mikael Ricknäs, AT&T 
Wants to Improve Overseas Credit-Card Fraud Prevention via Phone Geolocation 
(PCWorld, June 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/M7LK-44SL. Professor William H. 
Simon has recently suggested that the severe privacy harms caused by the illicit record-
ing and distribution of people’s intimate conduct “can only be restrained if the wrongdo-
ers can be identified” through government surveillance. William H. Simon, Rethinking 
Privacy (Boston Review, Oct 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5YDG-MK47. 
 64 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”) § 215, Pub L No 
107-56, 115 Stat 272, 287–88, codified as amended at 50 USC §§ 1861–62. 
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a significant threat to privacy with limited security benefits.65 To 
mitigate this threat, the Review Group urged, the government 
should switch to a system in which the metadata reside either 
with the communications providers—AT&T, Verizon, and their 
ilk—or with a newly created independent entity; the NSA would 
still be able to “query” the information pursuant to an order 
from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), but it 
would no longer be the custodian.66 “This change,” the Review 
Group claimed, would “greatly reduce the intake of telephony 
meta-data by NSA” and “therefore also dramatically . . . reduce 
the risk, both actual and perceived, of government abuse.”67 The 
USA FREEDOM Act of 201568 has now enacted a version of this 
recommendation into law, with the metadata to be held by the 
phone companies.69 
According to the separate statements filed by two PCLOB 
members, however, an overlooked privacy-privacy tradeoff 
threatens to diminish if not reverse the privacy gains that this 
reform is supposed to supply. Having the communications pro-
viders retain their customers’ metadata in an NSA-friendly for-
mat, PCLOB member Rachel Brand wrote, “could increase pri-
vacy concerns by making the data available for a wide range of 
purposes other than national security.”70 In a blog post elaborating 
on these concerns, Benjamin Wittes argued that “[i]nstead of hav-
ing one actor with a metadata database—an actor that is political-
ly accountable and subject to all kinds of oversight mechanisms”—
 
 65 See Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of 
the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court *12 (PCLOB, Jan 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ST8L-XRQJ (“The Board 
also has analyzed the Section 215 program’s implications for privacy and civil liberties 
and has concluded that they are serious.”); Liberty and Security in a Changing World: 
Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Com-
munications Technologies *113 (Dec 12, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/H9V2-KS4N 
(stating that the “enormity of the breach of privacy caused by queries of [a] hypothetical 
mass information database,” of the sort that could conceivably be compiled under § 215, 
“dwarfs the privacy invasion occasioned by more traditional forms of investigation”). 
 66 Liberty and Security in a Changing World at *25, 115–19 (cited in note 65). 
 67 Id at *118. 
 68 Pub L No 114-23, 129 Stat 268.  
 69 USA FREEDOM Act §§ 101–07, 129 Stat at 269–74, to be codified at 50 USC 
§ 1861. The USA FREEDOM Act does not, however, impose new data-retention obliga-
tions on the phone companies beyond what is already required by federal law. 
 70 Report on the Telephone Records Program at *213 (cited in note 65). Such an ap-
proach, PCLOB member Elisebeth Collins Cook likewise suggested, “would pose sepa-
rate and perhaps greater privacy concerns.” Id at *218. 
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the Review Group’s proposal could “proliferat[e] the number of 
people and organizations with access” to sensitive data.71 
As these critiques suggest, keeping the metadata with the 
private sector or with some newly created entity might merely 
shift the locus (and expand the scope) of the privacy threat, at 
least if the implementing rules are not well designed. A private 
sector model might also open the door to a richer array of que-
ries if additional phone companies are included in the program72 
or if the companies collect certain information, such as cell 
phone location data, that the NSA did not collect in bulk. And it 
might do this while lulling ordinary citizens into believing the 
privacy threat has been resolved. Add this all up, and one may 
wonder whether the Review Group has proposed “a bad trade 
purely in civil liberties terms.”73 
The answer depends on normative as well as empirical con-
siderations. Critics have characterized the Review Group’s pro-
posal as redistributing privacy risk from suspected terrorists’ 
associates to the general population. Yet in the absence of a new 
third-party database or new data-retention requirements, it is 
not clear that this reform will in fact generate or exacerbate sig-
nificant privacy vulnerabilities.74 Moreover, any distributional 
tradeoff that does occur is best understood, I believe, as part of a 
larger directional and domain tradeoff: although it creates pos-
sibilities for privacy infringements by commercial actors, dis-
persing the metadata makes it more difficult for the NSA to en-
gage in comprehensive data mining of Americans’ phone records 
 
 71 Benjamin Wittes, Assessing the Review Group Recommendations: Part II (Law-
fare, Dec 26, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/DJ3Z-BG2G. As Wittes noted, the rec-
ommendation that telephony metadata be held outside the NSA “played in the press as 
the heart and soul of the Review Group report.” Id. 
 72 See Charlie Savage, Power Wars: Inside Obama’s Post-9/11 Presidency 608 (Little, 
Brown 2015) (observing that the Obama administration’s § 215 reform plan “would make 
the NSA more powerful” in one sense, “by permitting the government to include,” for the 
first time, “every phone company in the revamped program”). 
 73 Wittes, Assessing the Review Group Recommendations (cited in note 71). See al-
so, for example, NSA Counterterrorism Program, 114th Cong, 1st Sess, in 161 Cong Rec 
S 2708 (daily ed May 7, 2015) (statement of Senator Mitch McConnell) (contending that 
“[i]n addition to making us less safe, the USA FREEDOM Act would make our privacy 
less secure” by leaving the metadata with companies that lack the NSA’s “rigorous con-
trols”); Bruce Schneier, Let the NSA Keep Hold of the Data (Slate, Feb 14, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/UCQ3-C6BD (arguing that the Review Group’s proposal “makes 
things worse in several respects” from the perspective of privacy and data security). 
 74 See Lauren Carroll, Lindsey Graham: Freedom Act Means Less Privacy for Phone 
Records (PolitiFact.com, June 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3RXF-BKJC (disput-
ing Senator Lindsey Graham’s claim that the USA FREEDOM Act “undercut[s] privacy” 
because the law “does not affect how the companies themselves maintain their records”). 
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or to apply that capacity toward a coercive end. A classic liberal 
fear of centralized authoritarian power has been given prece-
dence over a relatively novel fear of decentralized corporate 
abuse. 
Even if critics like Wittes have neglected this important as-
pect of the “trade,” however, they are right that the Review 
Group’s recommendations could give rise to a privacy-privacy 
tradeoff—and that, in consequence, it cannot be taken for grant-
ed that their adoption would be a boon for privacy. The Review 
Group’s failure to engage with this issue is particularly striking 
given that its report endorses a holistic approach to risk man-
agement, based on the insight that “multiple risks are involved” 
in NSA surveillance policy, from security to commerce to priva-
cy, “and all of them must be considered.”75 Faithfully applying 
this approach requires considering the interactions among not 
only different categories of risk but also different risks within 
the category of privacy. 
D. Machines versus Humans (and Bulk Collection versus 
Reading and Listening)? 
Perhaps the most dramatic privacy-privacy tradeoff con-
cerning NSA surveillance has been suggested by Judge Richard 
Posner. It turns on the consequences of having machines, rather 
than humans, at the front lines of the agency’s operations. An 
opinion piece from 2005 outlines the argument: 
The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast 
amounts of personal data is said to invade privacy. But ma-
chine collection and processing of data cannot, as such, in-
vade privacy. Because of their volume, the data are first 
sifted by computers, which search for names, addresses, 
phone numbers, etc., that may have intelligence value. This 
initial sifting, far from invading privacy (a computer is not a 
sentient being), keeps most private data from being read by 
any intelligence officer.76 
 
 75 Liberty and Security in a Changing World at *15, 46–49 (cited in note 65). 
 76 Richard A. Posner, Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis (Wash Post, Dec 21, 2005), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/YKX3-WV7T. See also Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, 
and Law, 75 U Chi L Rev 245, 254–56 (2008) (asserting that “[c]omputer searches do not 
invade privacy because search programs are not sentient beings” and speculating that “civil 
libertarians’ preoccupation with warrants” might prove harmful “to civil liberties if it in-
duces legislation to expand the reach of the criminal law”). For a similar argument on how 
computer searches may substitute for more invasive techniques, see Julian Sanchez, The 
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Posner makes two distinct claims about privacy in this pas-
sage. First, he contends that machines cannot by themselves in-
vade privacy; only other humans can. (A related position main-
tains that the collection and processing of metadata cannot, in 
themselves, invade privacy because metadata do not include 
“content.”77) This claim is disputable, but it would be of little 
moment if the NSA’s machine collection and processing of pri-
vate communications led to more of those communications being 
reviewed by an intelligence officer—an activity that, Posner im-
plicitly concedes, plainly does invade privacy. Hence the im-
portance of Posner’s second claim, which is that the NSA’s vacu-
uming up of personal data through electronic means can 
safeguard privacy by reducing the amount of human review. 
Restated in more general terms, the suggested tradeoff is 
that tighter limits on what sorts of data the NSA can electroni-
cally collect or mine at the front end might lead to looser—and 
more privacy-invasive—investigatory practices at the back end. 
Beyond the automated “sifting” function identified by Posner, a 
variety of mechanisms could conceivably produce such a result. 
In the absence of bulk metadata collection under § 215 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, for instance, the NSA might seek to identify 
suspected foreign terrorists’ American associates in a less surgi-
cal manner, through ever-widening wiretaps instead of link 
analysis and contact chaining.78 Tighter limits on what may be 
acquired under any particular authority, such as § 215, could 
push NSA officers to submit broader warrant applications to the 
 
Pinpoint Search: How Super-Accurate Surveillance Technology Threatens Our Privacy 
(Reason.com, Jan 10, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/7WFR-TWQU (quoting Professor 
Jeffrey Rosen for the view that high-tech “pinpoint” searches should be embraced by the 
privacy community inasmuch as they can “find illegal activity” without recourse to inva-
sive physical searches). 
 77 See, for example, Geoff Nunberg, Calling It ‘Metadata’ Doesn’t Make Surveillance 
Less Intrusive (NPR, June 21, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/PD6X-3DED (quoting 
Senator Dianne Feinstein as defending the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata program on 
the ground that “[t]here is no content involved”). 
 78 Government lawyers have gestured at this tradeoff in their public statements 
about the § 215 program. See, for example, Robert S. Litt, Privacy, Technology and Nation-
al Security: An Overview of Intelligence Collection *10 (Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, July 19, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/94AS-BTGU (“The collection [of 
metadata] has to be broad to be operationally effective, but it is limited to non-content da-
ta. . . . Only the narrowest, most important use of this data is permitted; other uses are 
prohibited. In this way, we protect both privacy and national security.”). According to 
Stewart Baker, under its “collection-first model,” the NSA has been wiretapping Ameri-
can citizens at a fraction of the rate that its European counterparts have been wiretap-
ping their own citizens. FISA Hearing, 113th Cong, 1st Sess at 77–78 (cited in note 58) 
(statement of Stewart A. Baker). 
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FISC79 or to make greater use of other legal authorities, as by 
expanding the targeting of non-US persons under § 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 197880 (FISA) on the 
hope or expectation that this would yield more “incidental” col-
lection of US persons’ communications.81 Barriers to domestic 
acquisition could likewise lead to more aggressive “privacy 
shopping,” whereby the NSA relies on foreign partners to obtain 
data it cannot lawfully or efficiently obtain on its own.82 
In short, it is not implausible to worry that collection limits 
could backfire or to think that the more (meta)data the NSA has 
at its disposal, the less it will need officers to review intercepted 
communications. Big data analytics can take over, to some ex-
tent, from old-fashioned listening and reading. And if one deems 
the latter to be an especially or uniquely significant privacy 
problem, then one can arrive at the unsettling paradox of prefer-
ring that the NSA “collect it all”83 on privacy grounds. 
I want to stress that there are many reasons why this para-
dox may not obtain in practice and why civil libertarians may be 
wise to decline to trade bulk collection for the hope of down-
stream privacy benefits. Unless paired with exacting rules re-
garding how and when data may be accessed, used, shared, and 
stored—and even if paired with such rules—“collecting it all” 
could easily lead to more rather than fewer privacy invasions of 
the sort Posner would recognize. Posner’s conception of what 
counts as a privacy invasion could also, of course, be rejected in 
 
 79 See Julian Sanchez, Leashing the Surveillance State: How to Reform Patriot Act 
Surveillance Authorities *24 (Cato Institute, May 16, 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z7B5-FNGV (“While it may be tempting to insist that a court order be 
obtained for all records, this could have the perverse consequence of yielding greater in-
trusion, as agents would have an incentive to sweep as broadly as possible in a single 
order . . . even when more-limited records would suffice.”). 
 80 Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, codified as amended in various sections of Titles 
18 and 50. Section 702 of FISA was added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 § 101, 
Pub L No 110-261, 122 Stat 2436, 2437–48, codified as amended at 50 USC § 1881a. 
 81 See Report on the Surveillance Program Operated pursuant to Section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act *82 (PCLOB, July 2, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/J42S-RRBZ (discussing the “incidental” collection of US persons’ commu-
nications and noting that, under the NSA’s PRISM program, such collection “is not acci-
dental, nor is it inadvertent”). 
 82 See Didier Bigo, et al, Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States 
and Its Compatibility with EU Law *17, 32 (CEPS, Nov 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6CDD-GKYL (describing “privacy shopping” as a technique by which in-
telligence agencies such as the NSA “exchang[e] targets of surveillance in order to use 
the loopholes created in many national privacy laws”). 
 83 Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, For NSA Chief, Terrorist Threat Drives Pas-
sion to ‘Collect It All’ (Wash Post, July 14, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/Z5WP-DFMJ. 
 242  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:221 
   
principle. And stringent legal limits on what sorts of data the 
NSA can acquire and analyze might be designed in ways that 
are both operationally workable and difficult to circumvent. In 
any event, the burden must rest heavily on the NSA to show 
that its voracious collection practices have been a net plus for 
privacy, relative to a world in which the agency faced greater ex 
ante constraints. A decade after Posner’s provocation, this bur-
den, too, remains to be met. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
Although it only scratches the surface of debates over sur-
veillance reform, the discussion in Part III demonstrates that 
privacy-privacy tradeoffs are deeply (if sometimes inconspicu-
ously) woven into the fabric of these debates. We would find the 
same thing, Parts I and II indicate, in virtually any area of in-
formation policy. How might we build on these observations? 
When privacy-privacy tradeoffs cannot be avoided, how might 
they be managed? Some basic suggestions emerge from the 
analysis above. 
First, scholars, advocates, and government officials could do 
a much better job of identifying and confronting privacy-privacy 
tradeoffs as tradeoffs. “Unless decisionmakers consider the full 
set of outcomes associated with each effort to reduce risk,” policy 
theorists have warned, “they will systematically invite [risk-risk] 
tradeoffs.”84 This warning applies equally in the privacy context. 
Managing privacy-privacy tradeoffs requires attention to, and 
information about, the full range of privacy interests that may 
be affected by a decision, the potential conflicts and congruities 
among those interests, and the expected distribution and degree 
of privacy gains and losses. It cannot simply be assumed that 
because a certain measure causes privacy harm, even serious 
harm, privacy would be enhanced overall by jettisoning the 
measure. Privacy policies and problems cannot be assessed in 
isolation. 
Second, the pluralistic turn in privacy theory may need to 
be qualified or supplemented in certain respects to accommodate 
the reality of privacy-privacy tradeoffs. Pluralistic theories of 
 
 84 Graham and Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs at 2 (cited in note 35). Profes-
sors John Graham and Jonathan Wiener propose numerous factors to inform risk-
tradeoff analysis but caution “that there is no magic recipe. Weighing risk versus risk 
will often require both objective information and personal judgment, both expert analysis 
and ethical values.” Id at 19. 
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privacy, recall, maintain that there are many different valid un-
derstandings of privacy and that none has priority over the oth-
ers.85 The ability to control one’s intimate relationships is no 
more or less central to the right of privacy than is the ability to 
keep secrets or to keep photographers at bay. The danger of this 
approach is that it increases the likelihood of intraprivacy con-
flicts (by recognizing more claims as privacy claims) while simul-
taneously depriving us of resources to resolve them (by refusing 
to supply a hierarchy of privacy principles). Domain tradeoffs 
raise especially acute, and on some accounts insuperable, chal-
lenges for consequentialist analysis. 
Privacy theory could make itself more relevant to privacy 
policy by offering guidance on how to weigh—or, in cases of in-
commensurability, how to order—various privacy interests when 
hard choices must be made among them. These choices are going 
to be made, wittingly or unwittingly. The overarching question 
for policymakers is whether privacy-privacy tradeoffs can be 
handled in a manner that better serves the goals of privacy, 
however that ideal is understood and integrated with broader 
goals such as social welfare or distributive justice.86 The devel-
opment of normative frameworks for evaluating privacy-privacy 
tradeoffs is an increasingly urgent task for the privacy field. 
Third, empirical research could assist in this task. At least 
when they do not have an a priori commitment to one privacy 
value over another, decisionmakers may find it useful to learn 
how affected parties would assess a tradeoff. And at least in 
some cases, such learning is possible. Privacy may be notorious-
ly difficult to measure and price in the abstract. But if nothing 
else, researchers and regulators can ask people whether and to 
what extent they believe an anticipated privacy-privacy tradeoff 
would be desirable, or they can design mechanisms that induce 
people to reveal their privacy preferences, and then feed the results 
 
 85 See text accompanying notes 21–29. 
 86 There are numerous ways this ideal might be pursued, from conventional cost-
benefit analysis, to cost-benefit analysis subject to deontological constraints, to a maxi-
min strategy that seeks to avoid worst possible privacy outcomes or to advance privacy 
for the most vulnerable groups, to a risk-reduction strategy that seeks to minimize over-
all risks to privacy, to a more experimentalist approach that continuously assesses pri-
vacy practices and reconsiders privacy goals. Resolving privacy-privacy tradeoffs in a 
systematic fashion requires both a substantive assessment of competing privacy inter-
ests and a decision procedure into which those assessments can be fed. 
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into a marginal cost analysis.87 A pair of computer scientists re-
cently tried this and found, through a simple survey, that many 
social network users seem eager to trade certain forms of personal 
information for greater control over the photographs in which 
they appear.88 The very asking of such questions, moreover, may 
have the salutary effect of raising anticipated tradeoffs’ salience 
and fostering debate. 
Fourth, Congress, the courts, and the executive branch can 
take steps to drive attention to privacy-privacy tradeoffs. To a 
large extent, the question of how to do this is an instance of the 
larger question of how to structure regulation of risk-risk 
tradeoffs. Scholars have proposed solutions ranging from greater 
coordination of risk reduction and cost-benefit analysis through 
the White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
fairs,89 to an interpretive principle allowing agencies to consider 
such tradeoffs in the absence of a clear congressional statement 
to the contrary,90 to the creation of new congressional commit-
tees to handle all risk policy.91 My own view is that the complexi-
ty and ubiquity of privacy-privacy tradeoffs counsel against 
trusting any single executive branch institution to make signifi-
cant decisions affecting privacy. Because each has its own inter-
ests, culture, and constituency, any given institution is liable to 
discount or overlook at least one side of any given tradeoff. It 
would be a mistake, on this logic, to house cybersecurity and cy-
bersurveillance responsibilities within the same institution. 
Whatever the best institutional design for regulating risk in 
general, at least two factors distinguish the case of privacy-
privacy tradeoffs. One is that the executive branch already con-
tains numerous entities, such as the PCLOB and the Department 
of Homeland Security Privacy Office, with the specific mission of 
protecting privacy and civil liberties.92 These entities are obvious 
candidates to promote the study of privacy-privacy tradeoffs and 
to counter possible biases of national-security decisionmakers. 
 
 87 In circumstances in which a uniform policy is not preferred on ethical, legal, or 
operational grounds, regulators may be able to go further and give people the option to 
resolve their own privacy-privacy tradeoffs, as with the PreCheck program. 
 88 See note 12. 
 89 Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1537, 1569 (cited in note 16). 
 90 Id at 1537, 1562–63. 
 91 Jonathan Baert Wiener and John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in Graham 
and Wiener, eds, Risk versus Risk 226, 250–51 (cited in note 35). 
 92 For an illuminating study of such entities, see generally Margo Schlanger, Offic-
es of Goodness: Influence without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 Cardozo L Rev 
53 (2014). 
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Reforms that encourage or require these entities to address 
privacy-privacy tradeoffs, and that enhance their influence on 
their policy process, could help in this cause. Through the USA 
FREEDOM Act, Congress has recently instructed a new class of 
amici curiae to supply the FISC with “legal arguments that ad-
vance the protection of individual privacy.”93 This charge repre-
sents a larger delegation of discretion than it might seem, given 
the many practical and normative tensions that may arise with-
in the category of privacy, and it cannot sensibly be carried out 
without consideration of privacy-privacy tradeoffs. 
Another partially differentiating factor is the relationship 
between privacy and secrecy. Some of the most pressing threats 
to privacy are now thought to come from the most secretive ex-
ecutive agencies and activities, as exemplified by NSA surveil-
lance. Controlling these agencies, and thus controlling the 
threat to privacy, requires meaningful congressional oversight 
and transparency. And yet the lurking tradeoff is that, unless 
designed with care, oversight and transparency can themselves 
put privacy at risk. Both involve, sometimes quite literally, more 
actors who can see what the regulated party is doing, which in 
turn may involve more actors looking at sensitive personal in-
formation in the latter’s possession.94 There is no global solution 
to this problem, but it can be managed through policies that 
provide for partial disclosure, review of representative samples, 
de-identification of personal data, and the like. 
Finally, it is important to remain on guard against false 
tradeoffs, exaggerated countervailing risks, and overly reductive 
logic in debates over privacy reform. Scholars have identified 
numerous flaws in the conceit of an inherent conflict between 
 
 93 USA FREEDOM Act § 401, 129 Stat at 279, to be codified at 50 USC 
§ 1803(i)(4)(A). 
 94 See note 33 (noting a parallel tension between privacy and open-records laws). 
Citing this concern, the NSA has declined to tell Congress how many US persons’ com-
munications are “incidentally” collected under FISA § 702 and Executive Order 12333, 
3 CFR 200. To derive these figures, the agency maintains, “would actually be invasive of 
privacy, because it would require government personnel to spend time scrutinizing the 
contents of private messages that they otherwise might never access or closely review.” 
Report on the Surveillance Program at *147 (cited in note 81). The NSA’s argument here 
strikes me as strained, as it seems likely that there are ways these figures could be esti-
mated—and the NSA’s operations thus subjected to more exacting scrutiny—without 
resort to massive human review of collected communications. See Alvaro Bedoya, Execu-
tive Order 12333 and the Golden Number (Just Security, Oct 9, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/66BL-BZNM; Timothy B. Lee, The NSA Could Figure Out How Many 
Americans It’s Spying on. It Just Doesn’t Want to. (Wash Post, Dec 4, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZH5T-V4JP. 
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privacy and security.95 An appreciation of privacy-privacy 
tradeoffs provides yet another reason why the “hydraulic con-
ception”96 of the privacy-security relationship is misleading: it 
implicitly assumes that the relevant threats to each value come 
from the other value, when in reality each may be just as likely 
to clash with itself. Incremental gains or losses on any given di-
mension of privacy have no clear-cut implications for the overall 
state of privacy, much less for the overall state of security. 
More broadly, as Professor Albert Hirschman has explained, 
the allegation that a progressive proposal will have perverse ef-
fects is a classic reactionary refrain.97 The mere fact that privacy-
privacy tradeoffs are widespread does not imply that existing 
practices have struck an appropriate balance or that privacy-
superior alternatives are unattainable.98 By attending to these 
tradeoffs, we may well find that existing practices are more 
problematic for privacy than they had seemed. The privacy-
privacy tradeoffs considered in this Essay are not logical truths, 
inherent in the concept of privacy. They are practical and social-
ly situated relationships—the product of legal, institutional, and 
cultural variables, at least some of which can be tweaked. When 
it seems like a privacy-superior move can be made at acceptable 
cost to other values, it should be. 
CONCLUSION 
Privacy theorists have lamented that, from safety to effi-
ciency to entrepreneurship, the “list of privacy’s [perceived] 
counterweights is long and growing.”99 Even if certain items on 
this list deserve to be removed or demoted, however, one more 
must be added: privacy itself. This Essay has explored some of 
the many ways in which interventions that strengthen privacy 
on one margin can end up weakening it on another. 
 
 95 For a powerful critique of necessitarian claims about liberty-security tradeoffs, 
see Holmes, 97 Cal L Rev at 312–18 (cited in note 14). 
 96 Id at 323. 
 97 Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy 11–
42 (Belknap 1991). 
 98 See Graham and Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs at 37–39 (cited in note 35) 
(discussing the conditions under which “risk-superior moves are achievable”). Nor does it 
imply, for that matter, that all unintended consequences will be undesirable. Interven-
tions designed to protect one sort of privacy may turn out to reinforce rather than under-
cut other sorts of privacy—generating privacy cascades rather than privacy-privacy 
tradeoffs. Exploring the conditions under which privacy cascades are more or less likely 
to occur might be another fruitful direction for applied privacy theory. 
 99 Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 Harv L Rev 1904, 1904–05 (2013). 
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There is nothing lamentable about this insight; on the con-
trary, it offers a way forward for theory and advocacy. Privacy-
privacy tradeoffs require recognition, study, and debate. Their 
existence does not make the pursuit of privacy any less vital or 
any more quixotic. When an agency such as the NSA stands to 
benefit from an alleged tradeoff, the agency should bear the 
burden of establishing the validity of the tradeoff as well as the 
value of the “trade.” Privacy-privacy tradeoffs asserted to justify 
the status quo must be scrutinized with particular care. But the 
problems posed by these tradeoffs are real and enduring. If we 
wish to minimize threats to civil liberties in an age of surveil-
lance, we have no choice but to try to make the best privacy-
versus-privacy choices we can. 
